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Abstract
Real world observations suggest that social norms of cooperation can be effective in overcoming
social dilemmas such as the joint management of a common pool resource – but also that they
can be subject to slow erosion and sudden collapse. We show that these patterns of erosion and
collapse emerge endogenously in a model of a closed community harvesting a renewable natural
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resource in which individual agents face the temptation to overexploit the resource, while a
cooperative harvesting norm spreads through the community via interpersonal relations. We
analyze under what circumstances small changes in key parameters (including the size of the
community, and the rate of technological progress) trigger catastrophic transitions from
relatively high levels of cooperation to widespread norm violation – causing the social-ecological
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system to collapse.
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Introduction

The history of mankind is one of gradual change in environmental quality and natural resource
abundance, punctuated with sudden collapses of populations, species, ecosystems, and
sometimes even of entire civilizations [1,2]. The most common example is the collapse of the
35

human population on Easter Island following the depletion of forest resources [2,3]. To explain
patterns of gradual change and sudden collapse the literature has focused on the existence of
non-linear relationships in the dynamics of renewable natural resources. Examples of natural
systems characterized by non-linearities are those that feature a minimum population size below
which extinction is inevitable [4,5], but also those with complex interactions between the various

40

components of the ecological system as is the case in, for example, shallow lakes and semi-arid
ecosystems [6-8]. Strong non-linearities in the regeneration functions typically give rise to the
prediction that continued overharvesting of the resource results in a gradual demise of the
resource until a threshold – or tipping point – is reached, beyond which collapse is inevitable and
subsequent system restoration is very costly, or even impossible [9].

45

In this paper we contribute to the literature on tipping points in social-ecological systems
by analyzing how social interactions between the users of a natural system affect its resilience.
Building on [10-13] we use evolutionary game theory to develop a model in which a finite
number of community members have access to a commonly owned renewable resource. As is the
case in the real world, we assume that the common property regime is such that community

50

members are allowed to harvest the resource, but that they are not allowed to hire noncommunity members to engage in resource harvesting too if their own time constraint is binding
[14]. Next, natural regeneration is captured by a standard logistic growth function, and
community members can decide to act cooperatively by limiting their extraction, or not. Agents
2
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are tempted to act non-cooperatively (also referred to as defecting) because of the extra income
55

this generates, but we also allow for the possibility that whenever a cooperator and a defector
meet, the cooperator may convince the defector of the social desirability of acting cooperatively.
The diffusion of social norms regarding harvesting is thus assumed to take place via
interpersonal relations, with cooperation being “contagious” [15-18]; see [19] for empirical
evidence in the context of renewable resource use. This modeling approach is consistent with the

60

experimental evidence that verbal expressions of discontent can induce and sustain cooperation
in social dilemma situations [20], but the mechanism can also be interpreted as reflecting peerto-peer sanctions or rewards [21-23].
Our paper generates tipping points without explicitly introducing (strong) non-linearities in
the dynamics of either the ecological system or the social-economic system. The resource’s

65

logistic growth function implies that the percentage rate of resource regeneration increases
linearly with resource scarcity, and the social-economic system is self-stabilizing as well. If, for
whatever reason, the number of cooperators increases, the social pressure on defectors rises, but
the benefits of defecting are larger too. Despite this apparent stability of its two components, the
social-ecological system can still generate positive feedbacks between them, giving rise to

70

alternative stable equilibria. For some range of parameter values the “good equilibrium” can be
very resilient to exogenous shocks or external developments (such as population growth or
technological progress in harvesting), while the same exogenous changes cause the socialecological system to collapse if the parameters are close enough to a critical threshold. The
positive feedbacks, giving rise to tipping points, emerge because the property rights regime

75

implies that each community member’s harvesting time endowment is finite. If an exogenous
shock causes a decline in the resource stock, the socially optimal individual harvesting effort
3
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level decreases. Cooperation thus requires agents to decrease their effort levels, and hence the
temptation to defect increases with resource scarcity. As a result, more cooperators decide to
defect, putting even more pressure on the resource stock. This leads to a spiral of depletion and
80

defection, and eventually, the system flips to the “bad” equilibrium. The societal consequences
of such a flip can be substantial because the system exhibits hysteresis. Upon system collapse,
moving back to the “good equilibrium” can be difficult and costly – if it is feasible at all.
We thus show that collapse can be caused by interpersonal interactions and economic
constraints, rather than by the presence of inherently non-linear functional forms. In that sense,

85

our model is related to models that generate tipping points in a general equilibrium framework
because of interactions between economic sectors, with increased harvesting in the resource
sector imposing a negative externality on another sector, resulting in even more intensive
resource harvesting [24,25]. Our focus on the social dynamics at the community level is
especially relevant because of the role of social norms in community governance of common

90

pool resources such as fish, forests, or grazing lands [26-28]. Our paper identifies a mechanism
why community resource management can be successful in some situations and not in others,
and is even relevant for resources whose regeneration functions are not characterized by strong
non-linearities. As such, the mechanism may have been one of the factors that contributed to
social-ecological collapses in the past [29,30]. But the insights obtained by this paper may also

95

be relevant for today’s policy makers. If centralized enforcement is cheap and effective,
community resource management is inefficient. But if the monitoring and policing costs of
formal regulation are high (for example when it regards resources that are geographically
remote), community management may be more efficient as long as the community’s support for
the social harvesting norms is sufficiently large, and this paper provides insights for the
4
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government to start intervening to prevent collapse. In that sense the paper also complements the
literature in which a formal regulator aims to enforce property rights [31,32].
Our paper is, however, not the first in noting that coupled social-ecological systems can be
inherently complex [33-35]. Iwasa et al. [36] analyze a system in which agents are more inclined
to undertake pollution-mitigating activities when the environmental quality is poor, and also

105

when social pressure is high. In their model, alternative stable states occur when social pressure
increases strongly with the fraction of cooperators in the community. This framework has been
extended to incorporate non-linear resource dynamics as well, leading to even richer dynamics
[37]. Taylor [25] develops a minimum viable population model in which resource extraction has
a negative effect on the profitability of a competing sector, rendering extraction even more

110

attractive. Our paper is complementary to this research in that we do not use any functional
forms that, by themselves, give rise to tipping points; in our model collapse can occur because of
personal interactions, and the fact that individuals’ time endowments are not infinite.
The setup of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present the model, focusing on the
mechanisms driving changes in the size of the resource stock and on those affecting the number

115

of cooperating individuals in the community. The analysis is fairly complex, and hence we
present the intuition behind the underlying mechanism in section 3, providing the proofs as well
as a numerical robustness analysis in section 4. Section 5 concludes.

2
120

The model

We assume that there are N > 1 agents in a community who have access to a commonly-owned
natural resource. The right to extract is exclusively associated with community membership;
community members are not allowed to employ outsiders to assist in harvesting [14]. The size of
5
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the resource stock at time t is denoted by X (t ). Each agent is endowed with a fixed effort level

ê which she can allocate to harvesting the common pool resource, or to an alternative economic
125

activity. The amount of effort agent i (i = 1…N) allocates to resource harvesting at time t is
denoted by ei (t ) . Assuming that the return to effort in the alternative economic activity is
constant and equal to w, the income agent i derives from this activity at time t is equal to

w eˆ  ei (t) , with 0  ei (t )  eˆ.
The relationship between an individual agent’s harvesting effort ei (t ) and the quantity of
130

resource goods harvested hi (t ) is given by the Schaefer production function, hi (t )  qX (t )ei (t ),
where q is a technology parameter. Assuming logistic growth, denoting the intrinsic growth rate
by r and rescaling resource units such that the carrying capacity is equal to unity, net natural
growth of the resource is equal to G  X (t )  rX (t ) 1 X (t ) , and hence resource growth is
given by

135

(1)

dX (t ) / dt  rX (t ) 1  X (t )   qX (t ) i 1 ei (t ).
N

Regarding harvesting revenues, we assume that resource goods can be sold at a time-invariant
unit price P so that agent i’s sales revenues are Phi (t )  PqX (t )ei (t ). Harvesting gives rise to an
intertemporal negative externality as excessive extraction today reduces the size of the available
resource stock tomorrow. This intertemporal consequence of today’s harvesting is sometimes
140

referred to as the “Class I problem” [38]. “Class II problem” then refers to the problem caused by
instantaneous externalities, where an agent’s income in a specific period negatively depends on
the total effort put in by the N – 1 agents in the community in that same period – think of
congestion or crowding. In this paper, we do not just account for the intertemporal externality;
we also introduce an instantaneous one (see below). We do so for two reasons. First, while the

6
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intertemporal externality may be economically more severe in the real world than the
instantaneous ones, the latter may be important too [39-41]. Second, analyzing the consequences
of an instantaneous externality on (myopic) agents’ propensity to cooperate, is much less
complicated than in case of forward-looking agents trying to solve the intertemporal externality,
while the underlying mechanism that is explored here is essentially the same.

150

We follow [42-44] by modeling the instantaneous negative externality as a cost
component in the agent’s income. While gross harvesting income is equal to PqX (t )ei (t ), we
assume that the community’s harvesting activity may cause congestion, the severity of which
depends on the total amount of effort (E(t)) the community puts into resource harvesting, where

E (t )   j 1 e j (t ) . Congestion may occur because the larger the aggregate harvesting effort, the
N

155

longer agents have to search longer for good spots, spend more money on fuel and
transportation, etc. [42]. We follow Clark [44] by assuming that the congestion costs per unit of e
arising from a one unit increase in the community’s aggregate effort (E) are equal to v, with v ≥
0.1 As he writes (on p. 1126), in “this convenient formulation, effort ei is always measured in
terms of its effect on the fish stock ( hi  qXei ), but the cost of ei [positively] depends on the

160

activities of other [agents].” That means that total income earned by agent i at time t is:

1

Note that the crowding costs are assumed independent of the wage rate, implying that we focus on crowding
resulting in increased expenditures on, for example, fuel or nets. To facilitate analytical solutions, we set the wage
rate equal to zero in section 4.1. If congestion costs were assumed to exclusively consist of forgone income from
outside employment there would be no externality for that case. For consistency, we thus need to assume that there
are cost components other than foregone income. As the wage rate is assumed to be exogenous, making the
congestion costs dependent on the wage rate increases notational complexity without yielding additional insights.
Therefore we chose to capture the congestion externality by a specific constant, v.

7
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(2)

yi (t )  PqX (t )ei (t )  w eˆ  ei (t )  vE(t )ei (t ) .2,3

Using δ to denote the agents’ discount rate, social welfare maximization requires maximizing the
net present value of community income, Y (t ) 



N

y (t ), as follows:

i 1 i



(3)

max E  e t  PqX (t ) E (t )  w  Neˆ  E (t )   vE 2 (t )  dt
0

165

subject to 0  ei (t )  eˆ for all i, as well as (1). Hence, (3) allows us to capture both the
intertemporal and the instantaneous externalities.4 When we focus on just the Class II problem
(the instantaneous one), we have    (because agents are very impatient, or simply because

2

We model crowding as a cost component rather than via the production function (with crowding reducing
harvesting productivity; cf. [41,45]) to keep the model analytically tractable. The latter modeling approach would
imply that the harvesting production function equals hi (t )   qX (t )  v ' E(t )  ei (t ) , and hence the dynamics of the
resource stock (see (1)) would be specified as dX (t ) / dt  rX (t ) 1  X (t )    qX (t )  v ' E(t )  E (t ) . The severity of the
crowding externality would then not just affect profits but it would also shift the nullcline of the resource. This
would complicate the analytical solution substantially without yielding any new insights, and hence we decided to
model the instantaneous externality via crowding costs rather than via decreased harvesting productivity. What is
essential for our model is that agents are tempted to defect because of differences in profits between acting
cooperatively and selfishly, and this is the case if one agent’s effort decreases the returns other agents receive on
their harvesting effort, but also if it increases the per-unit harvesting costs of the other agents.
3
As stated before, we use the same specification as Clark [44], but a more general specification would be the
following: yi  k  Phi  c(hi , w, Ei , X ), where k is lump-sum income, Phi are the harvesting revenues associated with
harvesting quantity hi and c(hi , w, Ei , X ) are the total costs incurred. What we need is that
c / hi  0, c / Ei  0, c / X  0, and a specification that meets these requirements is c  w, hi , Ei , X     w, Ei , X  hi
  w, Ei , X  hi2 , where    w  vEi  /  qX  ,   v /  qX  . In fact, this cost function is the one associated with problem
2

(2) – note that k is then equal to weˆ. Applying Shephard’s lemma, e  c() / w , we have e  h / qX , and hence
c(hi , w, Ei , X ) allows us to retrieve the Schaefer production function postulated in (1). Next, it also allows us to not
only infer the extra costs of crowding for given quantity harvested (c() / Ei  vei ; cf (2)), but also the full
marginal costs of crowding (that is, taking into account that the agent may want to change the quantity harvested, hi ,
in response to changes in Ei ). Maximizing yi  k  Phi  c(hi , w, Ei , X ) requires P  c(hi , w, Ei , X ) / hi so that
hi*   P    / (2 ). Substituting hi* into yi we have the maximized income function yi*  weˆ   P    / (4 ), and the full
2

 P    d
   qPX  w  vEi  / 2 .

 2  dEi

marginal costs of crowing are equal to dyi* / dEi   
4

From here onwards we omit time arguments, unless omitting them may cause confusion.

8
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they are unaware of the intertemporal externality); the case of Class I but no Class II problem
can be analyzed by setting     0 and v = 0.
170

We assume that agents can choose between two types of behavior: to act cooperatively, or
to “defect”. All agents are aware of the social benefits of internalizing the (instantaneous and/or
the intertemporal) negative externalities, and some of them decide to act cooperatively. Those
who do, are assumed to put in their fair share (i.e., 1/N) of the socially optimal aggregate
harvesting effort (that is, the one that solves (3) given the current size of X). Others, however,

175

decide to act non-cooperatively because of the higher income associated with defection. Each
agent that defects is assumed to choose the effort level that maximizes his private income level
given the aggregate amount of effort put in by the N  1 other agents.5 Using superscripts C and
D to respectively denote cooperators and defectors, the above assumptions imply that y D  y C .
The prospect of having higher incomes is what tempts agents to start acting selfishly, and we

180

assume that agents are more likely to defect the larger is y D as compared to y C . More
specifically we assume that the fraction of cooperators that decide to defect at time t is equal to


yC  X  
dC / dt
   1  D
 , where C(t ) denotes the number of cooperators at time t, and β is
C
y  X ,C 

the percentage decrease in C(t ) associated with a one unit decrease in y C / y D . 6

5

Most evolutionary game theory models on cooperation and defection assume that effort levels chosen only depend
on the behavioral mode chosen (cooperation, or defection), but not on the size of the resource stock [10-13]. In other
words, effort is either “high” or “low”, depending on whether an individual is a cooperator or not. In our model, the
allocation of effort is endogenous. This assumption is not just realistic, it also is crucial for explaining under what
circumstances a community is able to maintain cooperation, and when cooperation collapses.
6
Even though agents are discrete entities, we treat C as a continuous variable in the analysis. Explicitly
acknowledging agent numbers to be discrete complicates the notation without affecting the essence of the results as
long as the number of agents is sufficiently large (as assumed in this paper).

9
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Next, we assume that whenever a cooperator meets a defector, there is a probability μ that
185

the former succeeds in convincing the latter to act cooperatively. Assuming that social
encounters occur randomly, the probability of a cooperator meeting a defector can be modeled as
a Poisson process. Using D (t )  N  C (t ) to denote the current number of defectors in the
community, the probability of an encounter taking place in time interval (t , t  t ) is equal to

 C (t ) D (t ) t / N , where λ is the Poisson parameter. Social pressure thus increases the number of
190

cooperators by C (t   t )  C (t )   C (t ) D (t )  t / N , where    . Using the continuous-time
equivalent and combining the effects of social pressure and temptation, we have:
(4)


yC  X   7
dC / dt  C  N  C    C 1  D
 .
N
 y  X ,C  



Equation (4) thus captures what we label “contagious cooperation with the temptation to defect”,
and relies essentially on three assumptions. First, some agents are willing to uphold a social
195

extraction norm (doing what is optimal for the group as a whole), and try to impose social
pressure on non-cooperators to also start adhering to the norm [20,46,47]. Second, the propensity
to (dis)obey a cooperative norm depends on the temptation to defect, but also on whether
individuals have recently been exposed to cooperatively-minded agents. There is a vast literature
on the role of personal encounters in spreading social norms (see for example [48-51]). Face-to-

200

face communication is found to be very effective in inducing cooperation in laboratory
experiments, and much more so than alternative modes of communication [46]. Being confronted
with other people’s behavior conveys information and induces people to update their “best mode
If    ( N  1) / (2 N ), the system’s collapse results in C = 0 – see Proposition 1 in section 4.1 and equation (A6) in
appendix A3. If C = 0, we have dC/dt = 0 independent of whatever policy the regulator may want to undertake (see
(4)). This is neither plausible nor very interesting, and hence we assume that    ( N  1) / (2 N ).

7
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of behavior” cf. [18,49]. Indeed, even subtle cues of peer pressure are often enough to induce
rule-obeying behavior [48]. The idea of being watched (even if this is induced by mere
205

photographs of human eyes) tends to improve rule-compliance [52]. And if social interactions
are repetitive, the resulting behavior can become a social norm [50] which may subsequently be
internalized [51]. The mechanisms by which cooperation spreads include moral persuasion,
social pressure and feelings of guilt [20,47,53-56].8 Third, the probability of a cooperator
meeting a defector follows a random Poisson process. This last assumption is more likely to be

210

met in some circumstances (e.g., when defectors can hide their harvests so that cooperators can
only indentify defectors “in the field”) but not in all – allowing for targeted encounters would be
an interesting extension of the model.

215
3

Gradual changes in cooperation and resource conservation, and sudden collapse

The analysis of why the social-ecological system (1)-(4) is characterized by alternative stable
states is complicated. Because of this, we first provide the intuition behind the mechanism in this
section, and present all the proofs and robustness checks in the next.
220

The mechanism giving rise to positive feedbacks and alternative stable states is as follows.
To maintain cooperation, social pressure should be sufficiently large, and the temptation to
defect should be sufficiently small; see (4). The strength of social pressure is a function of the
number of cooperators: the larger is C, the larger the pressure on defectors to change their

8

Another mechanism often cited are punishments [23,57,58]. Although our model does not cover the option for
costly punishment, it is straightforward to see that both gradual change and sudden collapse can be generated by a
model with costly punishment. All what we need for tipping points to emerge is a countervailing force for defection.

11
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behavior. The temptation to defect is also a function of the number of cooperators. For given X
225

the temptation to defect (weakly) increases with C because of the following. Solving (3),
cooperators aim to maximize the (net present value of the) total amount of resource rents
accruing to the community. They take into account the (instantaneous and/or intertemporal)
negative externalities associated with their harvesting activities, and hence they put in less effort
into harvesting than defectors ( e C  e D ). The larger C, the larger the available amount of

230

resource rents, and hence the more tempting it is to defect and appropriate these rents.
So, the temptation to defect depends on C, but it is a function of the size of the remaining
stock as well. Perhaps surprisingly, the smaller X, the larger is the temptation to defect.
Cooperators take into account the negative harvesting externalities and switch to interior effort
levels at an earlier stage of resource depletion than defectors. Thus, e C / e D falls with resource

235

depletion, and so does y C / y D (because y / e  0 unless all rents have been dissipated). Hence,
the temptation to defect is larger the larger is C and the smaller is X. 9
With these mechanisms in mind, we now address the question why the social-ecological
system may experience periods of gradual change, punctuated by sudden collapse. Suppose that,
for a given set of parameters, the net social marginal harvesting productivity is larger than the

240

wage rate even if all agents harvest as much as they can ( ei  eˆ for all i = 1…N). Then it is
9

We implicitly assume that all agents know the current resource stock and the socially optimal effort level is public
knowledge. Furthermore, defectors can infer the number of cooperators, for example by observing their own net
returns to harvesting (from which they can derive the total amount of harvesting effort put in by the rest of the
community). These assumptions are fairly standard in economics but not necessarily very realistic. However, note
that our results hold as long as (a) for given X cooperators choose lower effort levels than defectors, and (b) the
effort put in by cooperators falls if X decreases. Both assumptions are likely to be met in the real world too. When
people observe the size of the stock to fall, marginal productivity of harvesting falls because of increased search
costs, and hence it is obvious that it is in society’s interest to allocate less effort to harvesting. Cooperators will thus
do so, but defectors try to appropriate (part of) the resource rents created by other community members acting
cooperatively, and hence do not reduce their effort at all, or reduce it by less than what the cooperators do.

12
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socially optimal for each agent to put in eˆ. This would be the case if the community is fairly
small (small N), if the outside wage rate is not too high (small w), if the rate of regeneration is
fairly high (r large), etc. Let us use e (r, P, q, N, v, w,  ) to denote the critical time (or effort)
endowment at which the socially optimal individual effort level (and hence e C ) is exactly equal
245

to ê in steady state.10 That means that there is no social dilemma as long as eˆ  e () :
e C  e D  eˆ so that y C  y D (see (2)), and hence, in steady state, C = N (cf. (4)).

So how do exogenous developments such as technical progress or population growth affect
the critical effort endowment e () for which e C  eˆ ? An increase in q or N amplifies the –
effective – labor input in harvesting: e () / q  0 11 and e () / N  0 . The larger N or q, the
250

lower the socially optimal individual effort level and hence the smaller the critical effort
endowment level for which a social dilemma materializes.
As long as the parameter set is such that eˆ  e () we have full cooperation, and increases in
N or q result in a gradual decrease in the size of the resource stock, because (effective) labor
input in harvesting increases. If exogenous developments in N, q, or any other parameter cause

255

e () to fall below eˆ, the social dilemma emerges and cooperators choose interior effort levels.
We then have eC  eD  eˆ, and we also have y C  y D (cf. (2)). As long as eˆ  e () is positive but
sufficiently close to zero, the decrease in cooperation and resource conservation is small, because
temptation to defect is small (as X is large) while the probability of a defector meeting a
cooperator, is high (as C is large).
10

Note that this means that e is a function of all system parameters except α and β. As long as e C  eˆ there is no
temptation to defect, and hence the probability of a cooperator convincing a defector to become cooperative, is
immaterial too.

11

At least for q  2rv / P; see appendix A3.

13
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However, we can identify a tipping point, eˆ2 (r, P, q, N, v, w,  , ,  ), where the same gradual

260

changes cause the social-ecological system to collapse. For the system to be in steady state, we
need dX/dt = 0 and dC/dt = 0 (cf. (1) and (4)). At eˆ2 (), the steady state is stable, but the
nullclines of X and C are just tangent. That means that any change in N, q, or any other parameter
can cause the equilibrium to disappear, triggering a spiral of defection and resource depletion. As
265

before, changes in N or q cause cooperators to reduce their harvesting effort levels, while
defectors continue to allocate their entire time endowment to harvesting. As a result y C / y D
decreases, some cooperators defect, aggregate harvesting effort increases, and the resource stock
is reduced further. This induces cooperators to reduce their harvesting effort even more, thus
resulting in an even stronger decrease in the income ratio, and a spiral of defection and resource

270

depletion unfolds. This positive feedback mechanism gives rise to a rapid deterioration of both
cooperation and the resource stock, and the negative spiral is stopped only when (almost) all
rents have been dissipated. That is, if the average net private return on harvesting effort is equal
to the wage rate (possibly zero), such that defectors are indifferent between putting an extra unit
of effort into harvesting, or not. Hence, if eˆ2 () falls below eˆ, the system moves from an

275

equilibrium with reasonably high levels of cooperation and resource conservation (the “good
equilibrium”), to one characterized by little cooperation and near-complete rent dissipation (the
“bad equilibrium”).12

12

Note that, unlike e , ê2 is a function of α and β – as well as of all other system parameters (r, P, q, N , v, w,  ). The
larger the steady-state number of cooperators, the larger the defectors’ optimal amount of effort, and hence the more
likely it is that a given time endowment ê is binding. Hence, the probability of a defector facing a binding time
constraint is smaller the larger is α and the smaller is β (cf. (4) and also (A12) in appendix A3).
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The typical pattern is depicted in Figure 1. On the horizontal axis we plot eˆ / e (), which
portrays the strength of the social dilemma, and on the vertical axes C and X (in Panels A and B,
280

respectively). We plot eˆ / e () rather than just ê to emphasize that a change in any parameter can
cause the number of equilibria to change – not just changes in ê itself. The straight lines connect
the system’s stable steady states that emerge under various parameter constellations, while the
dashed lines indicate unstable steady states. There are two branches of stable equilibria (for both
C and X), an upper and a lower branch. An equilibrium located on the lower branch is

285

characterized by very low levels of cooperation and with relatively small resource stocks – all
resource rents have been dissipated, and hence we refer to this equilibrium as the “bad
equilibrium”. The upper branch connects all the “good equilibria” – those characterized by
relatively high levels of C and X.

290

Figure 1. Bifurcation diagram showing internal equilibria of the number of cooperators C (panel A) and
the resource stock X (panel B) for different values of eˆ / e , reflecting the strength of the social dilemma.
Stable equilibria are connected by solid lines, unstable equilibria are connected by dashed lines. Dots

295

denote the two tipping points eˆ1 / e and eˆ2 / e , and the point e / e  1, where the social dilemma
materializes.

15
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Because we plot the ratio eˆ / e () on the horizontal axis, a move to the right can be the
result of an exogenous increase in eˆ, but it may also be the result of an exogenous increase in for
300

example N or q. If eˆ / e ()  1 , the social dilemma is absent and we have eC  eˆ and hence C = N.
Any increases in ê , N, q, etc. just result in a gradual decrease in the size of the resource stock –
the system is always in the good equilibrium; see Panels A and B in Figure 1. If eˆ / e ()  1, a
social dilemma materializes, because eC  eˆ becomes socially optimal while it is privately
optimal to continue putting in ê (that is, eD  eˆ). Cooperation then decreases as the temptation to

305

defect increases, but the resource stock itself does not fall by much. This is because cooperators
compensate for the extra effort put in by the new defectors by choosing lower effort levels
themselves, thus limiting the increase in aggregate harvesting effort. As long as ê is below a
second threshold level (or tipping point), eˆ1 (r, P, q, N, v, w,  ,,  ), there is just one stable
equilibrium, the good one. If eˆ  eˆ2 () there is also just one equilibrium – the bad one. If

310

eˆ1()  eˆ  eˆ2 () the system is in either the bad or the good equilibrium, depending on the history
of parameter changes – the system is located on the upper (lower) branch if the system
approaches eˆ2 () from below (above).
Starting from a situation in which eˆ  eˆ2 (), small changes in q, N or any other parameter
result in small changes in C and X as the system moves along the upper branch of stable

315

equilibria – until eˆ  eˆ2 (). When the system moves beyond eˆ  eˆ2 (), the same small changes
result in the social-ecological system collapsing to the bad equilibrium. Upon collapse the socialecological system is in the locally stable bad equilibrium, and the system can only flip back to
the good one if effective labor time becomes scarce again (that is, if q, N etc. fall such that eˆ / e
decreases towards unity). For the system to flip back to the good equilibrium on the upper branch
16
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320

it is insufficient to restore eˆ  eˆ2 () . Only if ê falls below the second tipping point, eˆ1 (),
defectors are sufficiently constrained in their harvesting efforts that they are unable to
appropriate all the extra rents accruing from additional cooperation. Cooperation increases, the
resource is exploited less intensively, and the stock recovers. That means that the difference
between y C and y D decreases, while the subsequent increase in the number of cooperators

325

causes the social pressure on defectors to increase too. As a result, a positive spiral of
cooperation and resource restoration pushes the system back to the good equilibrium on the
upper branches of Figure 1.

4

330

Analysis

Having provided the intuition why the system is characterized by a positive feedback, we now
proceed as follows. In section 4.1 we analyze the case where (i) agents are assumed to be aware
of the instantaneous externality (the Class II problem) but not of the intertemporal one (the Class
I problem), and (ii) there is no outside employment opportunity. That means that we assume
v  0, w  0 and   . These assumptions enable us to present the full analytical solution, and

335

the results correspond perfectly with Figure 1 presented above.
The assumptions of agents being myopic and fully dependent on the resource are
analytically convenient but maybe not always equally realistic. Therefore, we relax the
assumption of no external labor market in section 4.2. Analytically solving the case of w > 0 is
cumbersome, and hence we rely on numerical methods (together with a robustness analysis

340

testing whether the mechanism is the same for all possible drivers of change – population
growth, technical progress, etc.). In section 4.3 we drop the assumption of agents being ignorant
of the intertemporal externality (that is, we then assume   0).

17
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4.1
345

Cooperation and collapse when agents are myopic and dependent on the resource

In this subsection we assume that community members are aware of the instantaneous crowding
externality (the Class II problem) but that they do not take the intertemporal externality (the
Class I problem) into account – because they are not fully informed about the dynamics of
resource regeneration, or simply because they are myopic. Letting    in (3), the relevant
benchmark for cooperation is the aggregate effort level E that maximizes the community’s

350

instantaneous aggregate income while taking into account the Class II problem:
(5)





E ( X )  max E PqXE  w  Neˆ  E   vE 2 0  E  Neˆ .

Following Bischi et al. [59], we assume that cooperators always put in their fair share of the
aggregate effort, eC ( X )  E ( X ) / N . Solving (5) and dividing by N, we have:

(6)

355


eˆ

 PXq  w
eC ( X )  
 2vN
0


if

X   w  2vNeˆ  / ( Pq),

if w / ( Pq)  X   w  2vNeˆ  / ( Pq),
if

0  X  w / ( Pq).

Defectors choose ei (0  ei  eˆ) to maximize individual income, as given in (2). Using

Ei   j i e j to denote the total amount of effort put in by the N 1 other agents, a defector’s
best response (BR) function is
(7)

 PXq  w 1

e BR ( X , E i )  min 
 E i , eˆ  .
2
 2v


C
BR
Noting that Ei  Ce   D 1 e and using (6), the equilibrium effort of defectors is:

18
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360

(8)


eˆ


  PXq  w  2 N  C 

eD ( X , C )  
 2vN ( N  C  1)

0



w 2vN ( N  C  1)eˆ

,
Pq
Pq  2 N  C 

if

X

if

w
w 2vN ( N  C  1)eˆ
X

,
Pq
Pq
Pq  2 N  C 

if

0 X 

w
.
Pq

Note that the optimal harvesting effort of defectors depends on both X and C (cf. (8)) while the
socially optimal effort level chosen by the cooperators is just a function of X (cf. (6)).
Having derived the effort levels of cooperators and defectors, we now analyze under what
circumstances the social-ecological system is characterized by alternative stable states. To
365

maintain analytical tractability we set w = 0 in the rest of this subsection – but see section 4.2 for
the case where w > 0. Setting w = 0 is mathematically convenient because it substantially
facilitates the analysis of the social dynamics as embodied in equation (4).13 Note that despite the
fact that we assume    , the transition from the “good” to the “bad” state is still very costly
to society. Aggregate welfare under full cooperation is equal to Y C  q 2 P 2 X 2 / (4v) , while the

370

Nash equilibrium welfare level (that is, setting C = 0) is Y

the two, we find that

Nash

q2 P 2 X 2 N
. Taking the ratio of

v( N  1)2

Y Nash
4N

, and this ratio is quite close to zero even when N is fairly
C
Y
( N  1)2

small. So even when agents are myopic, the transition from the good state to the bad state
constitutes a severe welfare loss.
13

The temptation to defect is a (decreasing) function of y C / y D . Substituting eC and eD into (2) and taking the

ratio, we have

C
y C  PqX  w  vE  e  weˆ

, and hence y C / y D  eC / e D if w = 0, where eC and eD are identified
y D  PqX  w  vE  eD  weˆ

in (6) and (8).
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Let us now derive the steady states of the social-ecological system. In steady state we have
375

dX/dt = 0 and dC/dt = 0 (cf. (1) and (4)), and the (relative) levels of effort chosen by cooperators
and defectors crucially affect both the location and slope of these two nullclines. Hence we first
state the following Lemma:

Lemma 1: Effort levels of cooperators and defectors in (C,X) space if w = 0 and δ→∞
380

In (C,X) space we can identify three regions (denoted R1, R2 and R3) that differ in the effort
levels chosen by the cooperators and defectors:
(9.R1) If X 

(9.R2) If

2vNeˆ
, we have eC  X   eD  X , C   eˆ;
Pq

2vN  N  C  1 eˆ
Pq  2 N  C 

(9.R3) If X 

X

2vN  N  C  1 eˆ
Pq  2 N  C 

2vNeˆ
C
D
C
, we have e  X   e  X , C   eˆ, and e / X  0;
Pq

, we have e  X   e  X , C   eˆ , with
C

D

eC N  C  1

  C 
2N  C
eD

and eC / X   (C) eD / X  0 .

385

Proof: This follows immediately from inserting w = 0 into (6) and (8) and noting that

 C  

N  C 1
 1 for all N > 1. ■
2N  C

In region 1 (R1) the resource is sufficiently abundant so that there is no social dilemma (yet). In
390

R2 defectors still allocate all their available effort to harvesting, but cooperators choose interior
effort levels – and the latter type’s effort level is smaller, the lower the remaining resource stock.
In R3 both types choose interior effort levels (with eC  e D  eˆ ). The three regions are crucial
when drawing the phase planes of the system; see Figures 2A and 2B. The two boundaries
20
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between the three regions are depicted using thin, uninterrupted lines. The horizontal one is the
395


2vNeˆ 
boundary between R1 and R2  X 
 , and the downward-sloping concave line is the
Pq 


2vN  N  C  1 eˆ 
boundary between R2 and R3  X 
.

Pq  2 N  C  

The nullclines of C and X are also depicted in Figures 2A and 2B, and their locations and
slopes are derived in Lemmas 2 and 3 below. Before doing that, two things should be noted
about regions R1-R3. First, because defectors choose interior effort levels in R3, we can

400

conclude that (almost) all resource rents are dissipated in this region – if not, it would pay for
selfish agents to put in extra effort.14 This implies that the community’s aggregate income
decreases when the system moves from R1 to R3: the smaller the resource stock, the lower is
aggregate income, and the higher is the need for cooperation. Second, the income ratio y C / y D
decreases when the system moves from R1 to R3. The instantaneous net marginal benefits of

405

harvesting ( PqX  vE ; cf. (2)) are the same for all agents, and hence y C / y D  e C / e D . From
(9.R1)-(9.R3) we infer that y C / y D is equal to unity in R1, that it decreases when the stock is
being depleted in R2, and that it reaches its minimum (and remains constant) as soon as the
system is in R3. Hence, while the need for cooperation increases when the system moves down
from R1 via R2 to R3, the temptation to defect increases too. Having identified the three regions,

410

let us now have a closer look at the dC/dt = 0 isocline; see also Figure 2A.

14

Indeed, for all w  0 and using (6) and (8) we have E   PqX  w  / v in R3 because  N  C  /  N  C  1  1.





Inserting this into (2) we have yi  PqX  w  v  PqX  w  / v ei  weˆ  weˆ for all i = 1…N.
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Lemma 2: The dynamics of cooperation and defection if w = 0 and δ→∞
Lemma 2.1: In (C,X) space, the nullcline of the number of cooperators, denoted as C ( X ) dC /dt 0 ,
consists of three segments:

 In R1, C ( X ) dC /dt 0  N ,

415

 In R2, C ( X ) dC /dt 0   ( X )  N with d / dX  0 and d 2 / dX 2  0 ,
 In R3, C ( X ) dC /dt 0    N .
Lemma 2.2:  X  0,

dC ( X )
0
deˆ dC /dt 0

with the inequality being strict in R2.

Lemma 2.3: For given X, dC/dt > (<) 0 if C  () C( X ) dC /dt 0 .

A
Region 1

Region 2

Resource level (X)

Proof: See appendix A1. ■

Resource level (X)

420

B
Region 1

Region 2

Region 3

Region 3

Number of Cooperators (C)

Number of Cooperators (C)

Figure 2. The nullclines (dashed lines) and direction vectors of the number of cooperators (panel A) and
of the resource stock (panel B). The three different regions are separated by solid lines.15

425

15

Trivial nullclines ( dC / dt  0 at C = 0 and dX / dt  0 at X = 0) are not shown.
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Lemma 2.1 indicates that the dC/dt = 0 isocline consists of three segments. In R1 and R3 this
nullcline is vertical in (C,X) space, while it is an upward-sloping linear function in R2; see also
Figure 2A. The intuition is straightforward. Lemma 1 implies that the temptation to defect in R2
is high when X is small, and hence the equilibrium number of cooperators is smaller the lower is
430

X. The nullcline of cooperation is vertical at C = N in R1 because the temptation to defect is
zero, while it is vertical in R3 because here eC / eD is a function of C but not of X; see (9.R3).
Next, Lemma 2.2 states that the larger is the effort endowment ê , the more the dC/dt = 0
isocline is located to the left in (C,X) space in R2. The larger is ê , the less constrained defectors
are in their harvesting activities, the larger the temptation to defect and hence the smaller the

435

equilibrium number of cooperators that can be sustained at any X.
Finally, Lemma 2.3 states that the nullcline of C is an attractor. For any given X, the larger
is C, the larger the temptation to defect (because E is smaller), and the smaller the number of
defectors becoming cooperators (as there are relatively few defectors). Hence, for a given X the
strength of social pressure is larger (smaller) than the temptation to defect if C is small (large).

440

Let us now derive the dX/dt = 0 isocline, which we denote by X (C ) dX /dt 0 .

Lemma 3: The dynamics of the resource stock if w = 0 and δ→∞
Lemma 3.1: If eˆ 

rPq / N
 e , X (C ) dX /dt 0    2vNeˆ / ( Pq).
2rv  Pq 2

Lemma 3.2: If eˆ  e , X (C ) dX /dt 0 does not exist in R1 and hence consists of just two segments:
445

 In R2, X (C ) dX /dt 0   (C )  2vNeˆ / ( Pq) for all C, with d / dC  0,d 2 / dC 2  0 ,
 In R3, X (C ) dX /dt 0    2vNeˆ / ( Pq) .
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Lemma 3.3: If eˆ  e ,

d X (C )
d eˆ

 0.
d X / dt  0

Lemma 3.4: For any C, dX/dt > (<) 0 for all X  () X (C) dX /dt 0 .

Proof: See appendix A2. ■
450
Lemma 3.1 states that if eˆ  e () – see section 3 – the steady state must be located in R1: the
total amount of effort available ( Neˆ ) is too small for the community to be able to draw down the
resource stock to a level below the one where harvesting becomes a social dilemma. The case of

eˆ  e () (as described in Lemma 3.2) is more interesting, and is depicted in Figure 2B. In that
455

case, the equilibria are located in R2 or even R3, and never in R1. That means that the nullcline
of X then consists of two segments, one in each region. In R2 it is upward-sloping (and concave).
The larger is C, the lower is E, and hence the larger the resource stock that can be sustained in
equilibrium. However, in R3 the X nullcline is (almost) horizontal because here all agents choose
interior harvesting effort levels: if one defector decides to start acting cooperatively, the decrease

460

in E is negligible because all other defectors increase their effort levels in response.
Regarding the location of dX/dt = 0, Lemma 3.3 states that it is located farther to the South
in (C,X) space the larger is ê . The larger the effort endowment, the less agents are constrained in
their harvesting, and hence (for every C and keeping everything else constant) the smaller the
equilibrium size of the resource stock. And regarding the dynamics of resource regeneration,

465

Lemma 3.4 states that the nullcline of X is an attractor. For any C, the lower is X, the smaller the
aggregate quantity harvested (because of lower aggregate effort, and because of lower marginal
productivity of effort), and the higher percentage resource growth rate; cf. (1). That means that
for given C, regeneration is larger (smaller) than the quantity harvested if X is small (large).
24
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Having derived the shape and location of the two nullclines, we can determine the
470

number of steady states of the system. Visual inspection of Figure 2 suggests that the nullclines
can intersect once, twice or three times. Proposition 1 proves the existence of alternative stable
equilibria.

Proposition 1: For any set of parameters (r, P, q, N, v,,  ) , three critical effort levels can be
475

identified, e () , eˆ1 (), and eˆ2 () (with e ()  eˆ1 ()  eˆ2 () ), for which the following holds:
Proposition 1.1: The social-ecological system has just one non-trivial, globally stable steady
state (C,X) for each eˆ  eˆ1 (), eˆ2 () , where

ˆ  / r   (C1 , X1 ) if eˆ  e () ,
 (C, X )   N ,  r  eNq
 (C, X )  (C2 , X 2 ) if e ()  eˆ  eˆ1 () , where C2  C1 and X 2  X1, and
480

  C, X   (C3 , X 3 ) if eˆ  eˆ2 () , where C3  C2 and X3  X 2 .
Proposition 1.2: The social-ecological system is characterized by three non-trivial steady states
(two stable ones and one unstable steady state) if eˆ  eˆ1 (), eˆ2 () ;

Proof: See appendix A3. ■
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A e  eˆ  eˆ
1

Region 1

(C2,X2)

dX/dt=0

Region 2

dC/dt=0

Region 3

Resource level (X)

Number of Cooperators (C)
B eˆ1  eˆ  eˆ2

Region 1

(C2,X2)
(C3,X3)

(C2B,X2B)

dC/dt=0
dX/dt=0
Region 2

Region 3

Resource level (X)

Number of Cooperators (C)
C eˆ  eˆ2

Region 1

dC/dt=0
dX/dt=0

Region 2

(C3,X3)
Region 3

Number of Cooperators (C)
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Figure 3. Phase planes showing the nullclines (dashed lines), the region boundaries (solid lines) and the
vector fields for different values of ê . In panel A (e  eˆ  eˆ1 ) and C (eˆ  eˆ2 ) there is only one stable
equilibrium, while panel B (eˆ1  eˆ  eˆ2 ) exhibits alternative stable states.16

490
Parameter values as in footnote 19 and the focal parameter ê equals 0.689 in panel A, 0.713 in panel B, and 0.75
(panel C). Again, the trivial nullclines are not shown. Note that the intersection point of dC / dt  0 and the
horizontal axis (X = 0) and the intersection point of dX / dt  0 and the vertical axis (C = 0) are equilibria too, and
so is the origin of the system; cf. (1) and (4). As these three equilibria are unstable, we omit them in this figure.

16
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Depending on the values of ê , r, P, q, N, α, β and v, there may be one or two stable steady states
(and zero or one unstable ones). For simplicity, let us vary just ê and keep all other parameters
constant, so that e (), eˆ1 () and eˆ2 () remain constant too. If eˆ  e () there is no social
dilemma (see Lemma 3.1) so that C = N in steady state, and the resource stock is drawn down to
495

the level where resource regeneration is equal to the maximum quantity the community can
harvest.17
The analysis is more interesting when the community faces a social dilemma. Figure 3
shows the nullclines for the different qualitative cases of eˆ  e (). Lemmas 2.2 and 3.3 imply
that the higher is ê (for a given set of parameters), the more the nullcline of the social system

500

(dC/dt = 0) is located to the North-West and the more the nullcline of the resource stock (dX/dt =
0) is located to the South-East. If e ()  eˆ  eˆ1 () , the nullclines intersect once in R2 giving rise
to just one equilibrium (C2,X2); see Figure 3A.
An increase in ê beyond eˆ1 () causes alternative stable states to emerge in the range

eˆ1 ()  eˆ  eˆ2 () ; see Figure 3B.18 As stated in Proposition 1.2, there are then three equilibria,
505

two of which are located in R2 (denoted (C2,X2) and (C2B,X2B)), and one in R3, (C3,X3). Of these,
(C2,X2) and C3,X3) are locally stable, while (C2B,X2B) is unstable. When ê increases in the range

eˆ1 ()  eˆ  eˆ2 () , the nullclines shift as indicated by Lemmas 2.2. and 3.3, (C2,X2) and (C2B,X2B)

17

Just substitute



N

e  Neˆ into (1), set dX/dt = 0, and solve.

i 1 i

18

Indeed, eˆ1 ( ) is a fold bifurcation at which the “bad equilibrium” (C3,X3) is located on the boundary between R2
and R3, where cooperators choose interior effort levels but where the defectors’ effort constraint is weakly binding;
see equation (A7) in appendix A3.
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move towards each other, coincide (when eˆ  eˆ2 ()) , and then disappear (when eˆ  eˆ2 () ),
implying that (C3,X3) is the only remaining equilibrium – as depicted in Figure 3C. 19, 20
510

Figure 3 reveals the exact mechanics giving rise to the bifurcation diagrams presented in
Figure 1.21 For eˆ  e () there is no social dilemma and just one stable equilibrium, (C1,X1),
located in R1. The system is located on the upper branches of Panels A and B in Figure 1, with
C1 = N. If e ()  eˆ  eˆ1 () , Figure 3A applies, and there is a unique equilibrium: (C2,X2) in the
North-East of R2 (implying C2 < N). In Figures 1A and 1B this equilibrium is located on the

515

upper branches. If eˆ  eˆ2 () Figure 3C applies, (C3,X3) in R3 is the unique equilibrium (implying
that X3 is very close to the Nash equilibrium steady state stock), and it is located on the lower
branches of Panels A and B in Figure 1. And path-dependency emerges in the system because of
the fact that there are two stable equilibria in case eˆ1 ()  eˆ  eˆ2 () ; see Figure 3B. Whether the
system is in equilibrium (C2,X2) or rather in (C3,X3), depends on whether the system approaches

520

the threshold from a situation in which eˆ  eˆ2 (), or rather eˆ  eˆ2 (). In the first case, the system
is in the good equilibrium (C2,X2) – on the upper branches in Figure 1 – until it collapses when
exogenous changes move the system beyond tipping point eˆ2 () , when the positive feedback

19

This implies that eˆ2 (  ) is a fold bifurcation at which two nullclines are tangent in R2 (implying that the
cooperators choose interior effort levels whereas the effort constraint of defectors is strictly binding); see equation
(A12) in appendix A3.
20
The relevance of the time constraint (relative to the rest of the system’s parameters) is immediately clear from
Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. If agents have unlimited amounts of effort at their disposal, the effort levels chosen are,
by definition, interior, and then Lemma 1 indicates that the system is always in R3. In Figure 2 R1 and R2 are no
longer relevant, and the isoclines in R3 just intersect just once – see also Proposition 1 and appendix A3. With
unlimited time endowments (that is, if agents can hire outside labor), the system is de facto open access, and hence
the bad equilibrium is its unique steady state.
21
Indeed, Figure 1 is the numerical solution to the analytical results obtained in section 4.1 using ê=0.71, N=100,
P=50,000, q=0.01, v=1, r = 0.8, =0.1 and β=0.2.
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identified in section 3 brings the system down to the bad equilibrium (C3,X3).22 Having passed

eˆ2 () , reversion of the exogenous changes does not automatically move the system back to the
525

good equilibrium (C2,X2) because (C3,X3) is stable. The jump back to (C2,X2) only occurs if
parameters change so much that (C3,X3) disappears (which happens when (C3,X3) hits the
boundary between R2 and R3 – that is, when eˆ  eˆ1 () ); compare Figures 3C and 3A.23

4.2
530

Collapse triggered by various external changes if w > 0 and δ→∞

In this subsection we relax the assumption of w = 0, and we also explore whether the system’s
properties are dependent on the underlying causes of change – increases in time endowments,
technical progress, population growth, etc. With w > 0 we need to resort to a numerical analysis,
but we show that the presence of labor markets leads to results that are qualitatively very similar
to those obtained in sections 3 and 4.1; see Figure 4. Figures 4A and 4B show the internal

535

equilibria of C and X for different values of the effort endowment ê if w > 0 and δ→∞.

22

Note that because v > 0 collapse does not result in the complete depletion of the resource. We have X3 > 0 because
all rents have disappeared before the resource is depleted. However, the fall to the bad equilibrium still constitutes a
crisis, as defined by Taylor [25]: “a dramatic, unexpected, and [largely] irreversible worsening of the environment
leading to significant welfare losses”. Even if erosion of social capital does not necessarily lead to complete resource
depletion, the welfare consequences can still be dramatic for some or even all stakeholders involved [60]. For cases
in which the model does result in complete exhaustion of the stock, see section 4.3.
23
In Figure 1, the tipping points eˆ1 () and eˆ2 () are quite close, and this is of course the result of the parameters
chosen. The parameters allow us to represent all possible situations a community may experience (given N, q, etc.),
from the case in which it does not yet experience a social dilemma to the case where all rents have disappeared.
However, even though eˆ1 () and eˆ2 () are close, this does not mean that the circumstances under which collapse
happens is very limited. If technology (or any other driver of change in the system) moves the system beyond eˆ2 () ,
it flips to the bad equilibrium. The fact that the range [ eˆ1 (), eˆ2 () ] is quite small, only means that relatively small
changes in technology etc. are needed to restore the system back to its good equilibrium.
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Figure 4. Bifurcation diagrams showing internal equilibria of the number of cooperators C and the
resource stock X for w = 0.1. Stable equilibria are connected by solid lines, unstable equilibria are

540

connected by dashed lines, and dots denote the tipping points.
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As stated before, Figure 1 plots the case of w = 0 and δ→∞, and comparing Figures 1A and 1B
to Figures 4A and 4B reveals that with w > 0 the social-ecological system behaves in
qualitatively the same way as with w = 0 as analyzed in sections 3 and 4.1. A positive feedback
545

emerges because a reduction in the size of the resource stock induces cooperators to spend less
time harvesting, and the subsequent decrease in the income ratio y C / y D causes the number of
cooperators to decrease. In turn, the social pressure to act cooperatively falls, the number of
cooperators falls, and then the resource stock falls even more – triggering even more defection.
The main novel insight obtained from this analysis using w > 0 is that cooperation

550

increases if eˆ  eˆ2 () continues to increase after collapse; see Figure 4A. This (small) increase in
cooperation materializes because lim eˆ  y C / y D  1 if w > 0. If eˆ  eˆ2 , the social–ecological
system is in the bad equilibrium (where all agents choose interior effort levels), and hence
increases in ê or decreases in eˆ2 () only increase the amount of money earned at the external
labor markets, where the same wage rate applies to cooperators and defectors alike. Hence, the

555

larger eˆ  eˆ2 () , the larger the income share of wages earned at the external labor market, and
hence the closer the income ratio y C / y D is to unity. That means that the increase in
cooperation following environmental collapse should not be interpreted as a sign that the system
is moving back to a better equilibrium. Similarly, if the system has collapsed, the regulator
should not be concerned about the fact that policies aimed at reducing eˆ  eˆ2 () below zero (for

560

example by decreasing q or by subsidizing outside employment) actually results in a decrease in
cooperation – reducing eˆ  eˆ2 () reduces the wage share in total income and hence y C / y D
increases, so that it becomes more tempting to defect. As was the case in Figure 1, the system
only flips back to the good equilibrium if ê falls below eˆ1 () .
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Having established that qualitatively the same patterns emerge for w > 0 as for w = 0 (with
565

δ→∞), we probe further into the robustness of our results and interpretations by numerically
solving the system when changing the various key parameters, and then especially q, N, v and α.
Figures 4C-4F indicate that increases in the harvesting technology parameter (q) and in the size
of the population (N) yield qualitatively similar patterns as when ê increases – not surprisingly,
the only difference is that X continues to fall when q increases (Figure 4D). Next, if the

570

instantaneous externality becomes more severe (that is, if v is larger), the steady-state resource
stock tends to be larger (Figure 4H) while the equilibrium number of cooperators tends to be
smaller (Figure 4G). The larger is v, the higher the need for cooperation, but also the more costly
it is to cooperate. So the increase in X in Figure 4H does not occur because of an increase in C,
but in spite of a decrease thereof.24 The consequences of changes in α, the social pressure

575

parameter, are presented in Figures 4I and 4J. These figures show that for low initial levels of α,
increases in the strength of persuasion do not have much impact on either C or X – until α
reaches a tipping point. After crossing this threshold the system jumps to a much higher level of
both cooperation and resource conservation, and the system is also quite robust against possible
weakening of social pressure. If α has increased sufficiently for the system to flip to the good

580

equilibrium, α can fall substantially before the system flips back to the bad equilibrium. Again,
this is a direct result of the system exhibiting alternative stable states.

24

Interestingly, the welfare effects of higher crowding costs v are ambiguous. While an increase in v always
decreases welfare in regions 1 and 3, it may increase welfare in region 2. The presence of crowding costs reduces
aggregate effort, and hence higher v always attenuate the stock externality (the Class I problem). We find that in
region 2 the welfare increases resulting from the reduced intertemporal externality can dominate the welfare costs
associated with larger instantaneous crowding costs, but only for intermediate levels of v. Hence, our results are
similar to those established empirically by [61] in case of the shrimp fishery in North Carolina.
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Exogenous developments in the system parameters all give rise to the same dynamics as do
changes in ê itself – see section 4.1. All qualitative results obtained analytically assuming w = 0
carry over to the case of w > 0 (with δ→∞), and also the policy implications remain unchanged.
585

If X is observed to stabilize at an intermediately high level this is no guarantee that the system is
resilient against shocks. And if the system has collapsed, restoring the system to the good
equilibrium requires changing the system parameters such that eˆ  eˆ2 () .

4.3 Ecosystem collapse when agents are aware of both the Class I and II problems (δ≥0)
590

Let us now consider the case where the community members are aware of both the instantaneous
and intertemporal externality. We first derive the optimal harvesting effort of each cooperator,
and then derive the best-response function of defectors.
Cooperators put in their fair share of the socially optimal aggregate harvesting effort,
taking into account the two types of externalities. Hence, they solve (3) where   0. Let us use

595

z to denote the socially optimal steady state level of variable z when agents take into account
both the Class I and Class II problem of resource harvesting. It is fairly straightforward to




determine X () , E () and e C ()  E () / N (see appendix A4).
The best response function of a defector is stated in Proposition 2.

600

Proposition 2: Each defector takes into account the instantaneous externality vEi caused by the
effort decisions of all community members, but ignores both the instantaneous and intertemporal
consequences of his actions on the income (or welfare) of others. Hence, the best response
function of defectors is still given by (7).

Proof: See appendix A5. ■
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605
It is relatively straightforward to derive the socially optimal steady state in the presence of both
intertemporal and instantaneous externalities, and it is also straightforward to derive the bestresponse function of defectors to any action chosen by the cooperators. But it is very difficult to


derive the socially optimal trajectories towards X () because the presence of the crowding
610

externality implies that the optimal approach path is not the most rapid one. Besides, it is also not
very likely that communities in the real world are able to derive the optimal trajectories, and
therefore we assume that cooperators adopt a simple stock-dependent harvest strategy [64,65] by
C
using a linear feedback control rule: e  max a  bX ,0 .25 Figure 5 presents the numerical

results. The bifurcation diagrams presented in Figure 5 are qualitatively identical to those in
615

Figures 1 and 4.26 Indeed, the underlying mechanism is the same: the instantaneous income
earned by defectors are always at least as high as those earned by cooperators, socially optimal
harvesting decreases with stock size, and the time constraint ceases to be binding for defectors at
a stock size that is lower than the stock size at which cooperators start choosing interior effort
levels.

620

The main difference is that maintaining cooperation is even more difficult than in the case
in which agents are unaware of the intertemporal (or Class I) externality. Compared to the case
of agents being myopic, the cooperators reduce their effort levels even more for every X because
they now take both externalities into account. That means that for given C the income ratio
25

We assume cooperators adopt adaptive management (so that a < 0 and b > 0) aimed at steering the system towards

C
the optimal steady state. Furthermore, a and b are set such that each cooperator invests e () when X  X (). Our
results carry over to the more realistic case where the optimal steady state is not exactly known by cooperators.
26
Parameter values are   0.05, a  0.3, b  1.2. All other parameters are as before.
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y C / y D is even lower, and hence (i) collapse occurs sooner (i.e., all else equal, at lower levels of

625

ê , q, N, etc.), and (ii) the number of cooperators in the bad equilibrium is even smaller. This may
explain why communities are better able at overcoming the crowding externality than at solving
the intertemporal one [66,67].

630

Figure 5. Bifurcation diagrams showing internal equilibria of the number of cooperators C and the
resource stock X for different values of the effort endowment ê and with w = 0.1 when agents are aware
of both the Class I and Class II externalities   0.05 . Stable equilibria are connected by solid lines,
unstable equilibria are connected by dashed lines, and dots denote the tipping points.

635

Finally, note that while the collapse of the social-ecological system did not result in the
total demise of the resource, setting w = v = 0 in the intertemporal problem the resource is fully
exhausted if the system falls to its bad equilibrium. While the static externality (or a positive
wage rate) makes it uneconomical to actually deplete the resource, the intertemporal one does
not: as long as the instantaneous benefits of harvesting are positive, defectors continue to extract,

640

and even the last unit will be harvested if the social system collapses.
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5

Conclusions

We developed a model of renewable resource use in which agents can decide to act
cooperatively with respect to resource harvesting or behave selfishly. Adherence to social
645

harvesting norms can spread through the community because of interpersonal relationships
between cooperators and defectors (because the former try to convince the latter of the social
desirability of acting cooperatively), but community members also always face the temptation to
act non-cooperatively – because of the higher income. The resulting social-ecological system is
characterized by alternative stable states, so that small changes in key parameters (such as

650

population growth and technological progress) can trigger catastrophic transitions from relatively
high levels of cooperation to widespread norm violation – causing the demise of the resource.
Our setup is unique in that tipping points emerge even though both the ecological and the socialeconomic systems, by themselves, are inherently stable.
Positive feedback relationships occur in our model because of the fact that, in closed

655

communities, the amount of labor a community member can allocate to resource harvesting is
necessarily finite because the property right system usually does not allow members to hire
external labor. If the resource becomes scarcer, for example due to unfavorable climatic
conditions, the cooperators in the community decrease their harvesting effort while defectors
continue to allocate all their available time to harvesting – if the net private marginal benefits of

660

harvesting are strictly positive. A decrease in the size of the resource thus increases the relative
attractiveness of defecting, and makes cooperation even more costly. Fewer cooperators are
unable to maintain sufficient social pressure, thus triggering even stronger defection and resource
depletion. Thus, a positive feedback between the resource stock and the number of cooperators
emerges endogenously – possibly resulting in the collapse of the social-ecological system.
36
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665

Our model is purely theoretical in nature but it does yield some important policy
implications. Our model shows that social-ecological systems can suddenly collapse, even if
there are no non-linearities in the resource dynamics themselves. Many drivers can potentially
cause a regime shift, including technological change and population growth, so it is important to
monitor the system closely. Although the moment at which the system collapses depends on the

670

time preferences society holds, the catastrophic transition inevitably happens at some point – as
long as technological progress and population growth are unbounded. The associated welfare
losses are higher the more patient society is, but they can still be substantial even if the
community members are perfectly myopic. And the costs of collapse are even higher because the
system is characterized by hysteresis. Upon collapse, it is not sufficient to reverse the small

675

exogenous change that caused the system to collapse. More draconic measures are needed to
generate a spiral of increasing cooperation and resource regeneration – possibly at very high
cost.

680

Appendix A1: Proof of Lemma 2



yC 
Proof of Lemma 2.1: From (4) we have dC / dt  0 if   N  C  / N    1  D  . Because w = 0,
y 








we have y C / y D  eC / e D ; see (2). Using (6) and (8) and setting w = 0, we have eC , e D   eˆ, eˆ 
if X 

2vNeˆ
2vNeˆ
 PqX  2vN  N  C  1 eˆ
, eˆ  if
X
, and
, eC , e D  
Pq  2 N  C 
Pq
Pq
 2vN 





 2 N  C  PqX 
,
 e , e    PqX

 if 0  X 
2vN  N  C  1  2vN
C

D
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2vN  N  C  1 eˆ



Pq  2 N  C 

.

Inserting y C / y D  e C / e D into (4) and setting dC/dt = 0, we have
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(A1) C ( X )

dC /dt  0


N
if


  2v     Neˆ   PqX 


 (X )  N
if
2veˆ


 3 N  1 N 2  4 N ( N  1)     ( X ) if
 2

2

X

2vNeˆ
,
Pq

2vN  N  C  1 eˆ
2vNeˆ
X
,
Pq  2 N  C 
Pq
0 X 

2vN  N  C  1 eˆ
.
Pq  2 N  C 

Proof of Lemma 2.2: This can trivially be inferred from (A1).
Proof of Lemma 2.3: Defining V    N  C  / N   1  eC  X  / e D  C, X   and using (8), we have








dV / dC  0 for all X. Therefore, for any X, dC / dt  0 if C  C ( X ) dC /dt 0 . ■
690

Appendix A2: Proof of Lemma 3
Inserting (6) and (8) into (1) and setting w = 0, we have


2vNeˆ
if X 
,
r 1  X   qNeˆ

Pq

2vN  N  C  1 eˆ
dX / dt 
2vNeˆ
 CPqX

 r 1  X   q 
  N  C  eˆ  if
X
,
(A2)
X
vN
Pq
N

C
Pq
2
2






2vN  N  C  1 eˆ

r 1  X   Pq 2 XZ (C ) / v
if 0  X 
.
Pq  2 N  C 

where Z (C ) 
695

N  C  C / (2 N )
1.
N  C 1

Proof of Lemma 3.1: Combining X  2vNeˆ / ( Pq ) and dX / dt  r 1  X   qNeˆ X  0 , we have
X (C ) dX /dt 0   r  Nqeˆ  / r   if and only if eˆ 

rPq / N
 e.
2rv  Pq 2

Proof of Lemma 3.2: If eˆ  e () , a corollary of Lemma 3.1 is that dX / dt  0 for all
X  2vNeˆ / ( Pq ). Using (A2) we have
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(A3) X (C )

700

dX /dt 0


does not exist
if


 2vN  r  qeˆ( N  C ) 
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2
 2rvN  Pq C
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 2 X (C ) dX /dt  0
 0,
 0. And
C
C 2

because Z (C )  1 the nullcline is (almost) horizontal in R3, with X (C )dX /dt  0 

Proof of Lemma 3.3: From (A3) we have

vr
 .
Pq  vr
2

dX (C )dX /dt 0
dX (C )dX /dt 0
 0 in R2, and
 0 in R3.
deˆ
deˆ

Proof of Lemma 3.4: Defining W  r 1  X   q  CeC  X   ( N  C )e D  C , X   and using (6) and (8),








we have dW / dX  0 for all C. Therefore, for any C, dX / dt  0 for all X  X (C ) dX / dt 0 . ■
705
Appendix A3: Proof of Proposition 1
(i) For X  2 vNeˆ / ( Pq ) we have e C  e D  eˆ ; see (6) and (8). Using (A1) and (A2) we have

ˆ ) / r) ,
(A4) (C1 , X1 )  ( N , (r  eNq
ˆ ) / r  2vNeˆ / ( Pq) . Solving for ê ,
and this is an equilibrium in R1 if and only if X1  (r  eNq
710

(C1 , X1 ) is an equilibrium if and only if eˆ 

rPq / N
 e.
2rv  Pq 2

(ii) For X  2vN  N  C  1 eˆ /  Pq  2 N  C   we have, from (A1) and (A3) respectively,
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C ( X ) dC /dt  0 

(A5) X 3 
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(A6) C3 

3
1
4  N ( N  1)
vr
and X (C ) dX /dt 0  2
. Combining, we have
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2rv N
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2

(iii) For
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We have X 2  X 2 B , C 2  C 2 B (and hence just one equilibrium in R2) iff
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(A12) eˆ 

4 rP 2 q3





N 4 Pq 2  2rv  Pq 2    4rv  rv  Pq 2   P 2 q 4



 eˆ2 .

If eˆ  eˆ2 (A8)-(A11) do not have real roots; in that case there are no equilibria in R2. If eˆ  eˆ1 we
have

2vN  N  C2 B  1 eˆ
Pq  2 N  C2 B 

 X 2 B , and then (C2 , X 2 ) is the only equilibrium in R2. If eˆ1  eˆ  eˆ2

there are two equilibria ((C2 , X 2 ) and (C2 B , X 2 B )) in R2.
730
(iv) Combining (i)-(iii), if ê  e the system’s equilibrium is (C1 , X1 ) as defined in (A4), if

e  eˆ  eˆ1 there is just one equilibrium ( (C2 , X 2 ) as defined in (A8) and (A9)), if eˆ  eˆ2 there is
just one equilibrium ( (C3 , X 3 ) as defined in (A5) and (A6)), and if eˆ1  eˆ  eˆ2 there are three
equilibria ((C2 , X 2 ) , (C2 B , X 2 B ) and (C3 , X 3 ) as defined in (A5)-(A6) and (A8)-(A11)).■
735
Appendix A4: The socially optimal steady state in the presence of both externalities

Writing down the current value Hamiltonian of (3), taking the appropriate first derivates, setting
all time derivatives equal to zero and solving, the socially optimal steady state levels of E and X



(denoted by E and X ) are implicitly determined by the following two equations:
740

(A13)   r 

 
Pq 2 XE


 2rX  qE




PqX  w  2vE

 



(A14) E  r 1  X / q,



and where, in the optimum, each cooperator sets e C  E / N . X and E are then equal to
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2



4 q Pq  rv

745



where Q  Pq 2  2rv .

Appendix A5: Proof of Proposition 2

We follow the literature on dynamic games; see for example [62] and Dockner et al. [63, pp.
333-335]. We show that even though defectors are forward-looking, in our model they do not
750

place any value on increased harvesting opportunities in the next period nor in any future period
because they know that any unit of resource they do not harvest, others will harvest it. By
analogy that means that in the presence of both intertemporal and crowding externalities they do
not take into account the consequences of their behavior on their future returns, and therefore
their best-response function is the same in the intertemporal model as in the myopic model.

755

Suppose that there is just a dynamic externality, and no crowding externality, and for
simplicity assume also that w = 0. The maximization problem faced by each of the N – C
defectors is the following:


(A17) max  e s PqXeids subject to X  G( X )  qX [CeC  ( N  C 1)eD  ei ].
t

Because we ignore the crowding externality, the current value Hamiltonian of the defector’s
760

optimization problem is H  PqXei   G( X )  qX [CeC  ( N  C 1)eD  ei ] , and is thus linear in
control variable ei . That means that we have a bang-bang solution (or most rapid approach path)
for defectors. To take into account that cooperators may lack full information about the socially
42

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper787

42

Richter et al.: Contagious Cooperation, Temptation, and Ecosystem Collapse

optimal harvesting path, we generalize the effort levels chosen by cooperators by eC  eC ( X ) ,



with eC ( X )/ X  0. 27 The question is whether there is a steady state X that satisfies X  0 . If
765


X 0

is

a

steady

state,

we

have





X  G( X )  qX [CeC ( X )  ( N  C)eD ( X , C)]  0 ,

or






G( X )  qXCeC ( X ) 28
. Because the defector’s Hamiltonian is linear in his effort level, X

e ( X , C) 
( N  C)qX
D

is a steady state if the following strategy is an equilibrium strategy:

eˆ




 1  G ( X )  CeC ( X ) 
D

(A18) e ( X , C )  


qX

N C 

0


if


X  X,


if X  X ,
if


0  X  X.


It is easy to show that this is not an equilibrium strategy (implying that X is not a steady state).
770

Given the above strategies, we can rewrite the resource dynamics (for all X  X ) as follows:
(A19) X  G( X )  qX [CeC ( X )  ( N  C 1)eD ( X , C)]  qXei  Q( X , C)  qXei  Q( X , C)  hi ,
where Q( X , C ) is the “residual regeneration function” that agent i faces. A steady state is now
implicitly defined by hi  qXei  Q( X , C). Let us now calculate h  Q( X , C ) for all levels of

XX:

775



G ( X )  qXeC ( X )  qX ( N  C  1)e D ( X )
(A20) hi  Q( X , C )  
C
G ( X )  qXe ( X )


if X  X ,

if 0  X  X .

27

Absent crowding, the Hamiltonian of cooperators is also linear in effort, and hence the socially optimal solution is
e  e for all X  X , 0  e C  eˆ if X  X , and zero otherwise.

28
If cooperators have full information about the socially optimal harvesting path, eC ( X ) would be equal to zero.
Obviously, with defection, any feasible steady state would consist of a resource stock that is smaller than the

socially optimal stock; X  X .
C
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Clearly, (A18) is not an equilibrium strategy and  X , e D ( X , C )  is not an equilibrium, because if


agent i reduces the stock by an infinitesimally small amount below X , (A18) indicates that all
(N–C–1) other defectors choose a zero effort level, and hence (A20) shows that agent i can




harvest infinitesimally less than G( X )  CeC ( X ) for now and forever (with, possibly, eC ( X )  0
780

if

cooperators

follow

the

socially

optimal

path)

rather

than

just




G ( X )  CeC ( X )  qX ( N  C  1)e D ( X ) for now and forever. That means that harvesting zero is

not optimal for all other defectors, (A18) cannot hold and



 X ,e

D


(X )



is not an equilibrium.


And this holds for any X  0 so that X = 0 is the only steady state.
Absent any crowding externalities, the best-response function of defectors is thus to
785

always put in maximum effort into harvesting until the stock is fully depleted. With crowding
externalities, it is also always privately optimal to harvest until all rents have been dissipated –
and defectors only choose interior effort levels if the crowding externality makes putting in e  eˆ
unprofitable – as is the case when agents are myopic.
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